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Introduction 
The final Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is being implemented midst 
rancour and debate about what counts as knowledge, and who will do the 
counting. This mechanism for measuring research productivity has created 
imperatives for most lecturers in the UK – intensifying the pressure on 
academics not just to produce ‘research outputs’ but to produce certain types 
of knowledge in certain types of publication. Its demise is not grounds for 
celebration, however, since a metrics-based alternative looks set to entrench 
existing funding success more deeply and make it even harder to do research 
that has no customer (e.g. Bekhradnia 20/06/06). This chapter does not 
address which mechanism provides a more truthful account of the value of a 
set of ‘research outputs’. Instead, it is concerned with the power of such a 
mechanism to reinforce particular values and to inscribe resulting hierarchies 
regarding knowledge. We will argue that, regardless of what replaces it, the 
RAE process will have been productive, not just reflective of academic values. 
We will examine some of the consequences of the RAE for UK academic life, 
focusing on two themes, both of which highlight the operation of power 
through processes of knowledge production.  
 
First, we will consider ways in which practices intended merely to measure 
research productivity themselves create particular dynamics of power and 
produce or sustain particular hierarchies regarding types of research and 
models of knowledge production. In addition, we will argue that what, at one 
level, appears a rational, if overly-bureaucratic, measuring exercise is, in 
practice, a variable and shifting endeavour that rests on highly subjective 
‘measures’. We suspect that, not only does it fail to live up to its promise of 
transparency and clarity, but, as more is written about the criteria in the name 
of clarity, the closer we get to MacLure’s use of Breton’s ‘clarity bordering on 
stupidity’ (2005: 1).  
 
Second, we will explore the impact of these dynamics and status hierarchies 
for individual academics. As academics become increasingly self-conscious of 
performance indicators and, individually more visible through them, we are 
more tightly disciplined by them. The way our research performance is 
measured and judged comes to be productive of our ways of being and our 
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academic selves, and we wish to register some concerns about the 
consequences of this. We draw upon our own and colleagues’ experiences of 
trying to make sense of and navigate the RAE. These allow us to explore the 
curtailment of professional and personal freedoms and the reshaping of 
expectations and obligations that are productive in their effects: reconstructing 
academic work, and those who do it, in ways that serve the prevailing model 
of institutional competition. Our concern in each case is that the ‘mentalities’ 
sustained by the RAE will outlive our memory of the arbitrariness of their 
production and our criticality about them, leaving the values and hierarchies 
reified even harder to contest. We will therefore have ended up valuing what 
was measured in spite of ourselves. 
 
What is the RAE? 
The Research Assessment Exercise is a process by which the research of UK 
universities has been evaluated in order to determine future funding, or rather, 
‘to inform the selective distribution of public funds for research by the four UK 
higher education funding bodies’ (RAE 2006: 1, itals added). It therefore 
provides the UK’s Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
with information for the selective allocation of research funds to universities as 
part of their block grant. The next RAE (2007/8) will be the 6th in the series 
conducted nationally since 1986. This process of assessing research has 
been highly controversial and yet is currently informing models being 
developed for use in Australia and elsewhere (McNay 2006).The RAE is 
merely the particular instantiation of more general pressures associated with 
the rise of the audit culture and new managerialism over the last 20 years in 
the UK and beyond. Yet it has changed fundamentally - at both individual and 
institutional levels - what is produced and what is valued in academia.  
 
The most obvious way in which the RAE wields power is in the grading of 
research outputs (e.g. chapters, books, articles, reports) and the hierarchical 
ranking of Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) on the basis of a summation of 
these. A revised ‘marking system’ for producing these gradings - seeking to 
measure the quality of each output, and assign it a value on a scale - has 
been devised and made public before each RAE. Such grading schemes 
attempt to discriminate between knowledge outputs according to objectively 
applied criteria and have generally sought to make explicit how value is 
assigned and by whom through publication of the criteria and of the panels of 
judges.  
 
Despite such attempts at transparency, the rules of ‘the game’ can be hard to 
fathom. Differing accounts of ‘the rules’ emerge from differing interpretations, 
from the various strategies HEI managers adopt, and because of actual 
revisions between successive RAEs, which provide some basis in fact to our 
sense of shifting ‘goalposts’. For example, some of us were academically 
socialised (in the social sciences) into prizing book authorship and aspired to 
win book contracts after our initial publications of chapters or articles, only to 
find when we eventually did that the message about what is valued has 
changed, and, in line with scientific rather than arts disciplines, the journal 
article is the prized form of publication. The broad adoption of a value-system 
rooted in the sciences is the most general example of the hierarchies of 
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knowledge forms, favouring empirical research and, within that, quantitative 
methods. Between the 2001 and 2008 RAEs, an explicit shift instituted across 
disciplines was the emphasis on quality of research output, not quantity. This 
grew out of a widespread recognition (including by the Government, see 
McNay 2006) that the RAE process had skewed academic production by 
pressuring academics to write multiple outputs on the same findings. 
 
In the 2006 Budget speech, and between first and second drafts of this 
chapter, the Government announced its intention not to conduct further 
Research Assessment Exercises after 2007/08, and even considered 
abandoning that one (Sastry and Bekhradnia 2006) (see HEPI website for 
details). This news did not salve our concerns about the existing and ongoing 
consequences of the process to date. In exploring how both knowledge 
production and practices of the academic self have changed under RAE 
conditions, a model of power is employed that exposes both the productive 
and repressive functioning of institutional power (Foucault 1981; Henriques et 
al 2002). Our disquiet about the RAE come from our perception that 1) we do 
not share some of the values it embodies, which run counter to our own 
understandings of what constitutes valuable, socially responsible research; 2) 
the political consequences of these values are undesirable; and 3) the 
process is not as value-neutral as is implied by the rhetoric of measurement. 
Here we will focus primarily on the consequences for knowledge production 
and aspects of academic subjectivity and touch briefly on the values and 
objectivity arguments. We now turn to the vexed issue of how indeed to 
measure research value/output, which means engaging with the RAE’s 
technical detail.  
 
Measuring what we value 
For the 2008 RAE the aim of the evaluators is not simply to award each unit of 
assessment (UoA) (usually a Department) a single grade as in the past, but 
to produce ‘Overall quality profiles’ that reflect the percentage of their 
research activity that is rated in each of five grades. These grades are: ‘world-
leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour’ (4*); ‘internationally 
excellent’ in terms of originality, significance and rigour (3*); ‘recognised 
internationally…’ (2*); ‘recognised nationally…’ (1*) and ‘falls below the 
standard of nationally recognised work’ (‘Unclassified’) (RAE 01/2005: 24, 
Table 2, cited in Johnston 2005: 117). This grading is applied three times for 
each UoA in order to grade ‘three overarching elements: research outputs, 
research environment and esteem indicators’ (RAE 01/2005: 10, #38, d, ii, 
cited in Johnston 2005: 116). The weighted sum of these gives the quality 
profile, where different subject panels can decide what weighting to give 
research outputs relative to the other two elements for their disciplines (e.g. 
Johnston 2005). Sub-panels – comprised of academics who ‘are currently or 
have recently been active in high quality research’ - will decide which 
indicators will be used for each element (RAE 01/2005: 5, #18, cited from 
Johnston 2005: 115). Because of this complexity, the exercise is a massive 
task for universities and assessors. In addition, the commitment this time to 
read almost all published outputs (in response to earlier criticisms) means that 
the ‘burden of RAE 2008 will be much greater than ever before’ (Johnston 
2005: 116).  
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But what does ‘international’ mean as an indicator of quality? The widespread 
concern has been that research on locally relevant matters and practitioner-
led disciplines maybe wholly characterised by ‘low status’ research since 
large sections of the discipline’s work may engage only a UK audience, yet 
may still make a significant contribution (Lewis 2002, cited in McNay 2006). 
One of us takes pride in a short publication in a practitioner journal because a 
Health Visitor responded saying how useful she found it to show to new 
mothers, yet the article is low status by RAE terms because of its style, length 
and location in a non-academic publication. Despite later reassurance in 2005 
that ‘”World-leading”, “internationally” and “nationally” in this context refer to 
quality standards.. not to the nature or geographical scope of particular 
subjects (RAE 01/2005: 24, #3, cited from Johnston 2005: 117), this concern 
remains.  Johnston, for one, remains critical – and like McNay and Lewis he is 
an ex-panel member. He says: 
‘These are very fine distinctions, to say the least: how do you 
distinguish something that is ‘internationally excellent’ from something 
that is ‘recognised internationally’ on the same criteria – ‘originality, 
significance and rigor’ – always assuming that you can define an 
absolute standard associated with ‘internationally’? (Johnston 2005: 
117) 
 
The meaning of international in terms of relevance, place of publication or as 
some purported indicator of standard has been a matter of debate and 
confusion. It adds a level of variation between panels (in addition to their 
choice of weightings) because some have elaborated this whilst others have 
not. In the past, the Sociology panel recognised that ‘work that has not 
received international attention can be of international quality’ (HEFCE 1999: 
175, cited in McNay 2006) and in the last (2001) RAE, even those involved in 
making assessments were sometimes unclear about what counted as 
‘international excellence’. For instance, Lewis reported (of her experience on 
the Social Policy & Administration and Social Work panel) that:  
‘One of the interesting quirks of the RAE is that it was concerned to 
measure the quality of research, but what was meant by ‘quality’ was 
never defined. Somehow we were all meant to be able to identify it – 
and grade it – when we saw it.’ (2002: 5, cited by McNay 2006) 
 
This is akin to what McNay (2005 personal communication) and other 
education theorists call ‘the elephant mode of marking’ where assessors use 
their confidence that ‘they will know one when they see one’ to excuse limited 
criteria. In addition, as Johnston (2005) asks, how are assessors to know how 
many submissions should be in each grade band (in fact, how many world-
leading articles were published in each discipline since the last RAE)? As 
lecturers we are expected to know which type of grading system we apply: 
criterion-referenced or norm-referenced (e.g. Rowntree 1987). In the former it 
doesn’t matter how many are assigned each rank, just that they meet the 
criteria, but in the latter, exactly where they fall relative to the whole group is 
the key defining feature of their grade. Given that the exercise is to allocate a 
limited amount of money, the gradings are surely relative to the whole set of 
work done and so a normal distribution of ‘quality’ might be assumed. The 
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brief criteria provided might be more meaningful if assessors were told to 
assume this distribution of grades. 
 
A normal distribution however assumes the whole population is represented, 
whereas not all the research conducted is submitted for assessment as we 
shall see. Other ways in which institutions ‘play the RAE game’ affect the 
pattern too. The mean ratings have improved markedly over time, particularly 
between the 1996 and 2001 RAEs, leading Sharp (2004: 202), for instance, to 
conclude that ‘the size and stability of the differences are sufficient to cast 
some doubt on the consistency of assessment standards across time and 
subjects’ . However, the meaning of rising grades is ambiguous: are 
individuals and/or institutions producing better research, getting better at 
‘playing the game’, or is there ‘grade inflation’ like some claim affects our 
degree marking? In addition, the goalposts have shrunk so that only a 
narrowing band of departments/UoAs at the top receive any money, rather 
than the higher ranked UoAs receiving progressively more money. Having a 
measure therefore doesn’t appear to guarantee that we know what it means. 
 
Furthermore, these wrangles over assigning value distract us from the 
inequity of ranking against each other institutions with dissimilar comparators 
(Turner 2005) or applying the same pressure for research outputs to staff who 
are primarily teachers as to those who are primarily researchers. It is 
commonly recognised that being a lecturer at a new (post-1992) university 
tends to carry a much larger teaching load than in an ‘old’ university, yet the 
RAE makes no allowance for this. In addition, departments engaged in 
professional training feel unfairly treated since their teaching, tightly regulated 
by external bodies, cannot be squeezed to make more room for research.  
 
RAE08’s emphasis on quality of research output goes some way to 
addressing this, but the attempt to give ‘quality’ an objective status and 
quantifiable character seems optimistic. Stating criteria lends the appearance 
of objectivity when actually the application of these criteria is harder than their 
neat definitions suggest. How far can claims to rational objectivity be upheld 
when subjective judgements clearly form a key element in the assessment 
process? How can a process designed to discriminate between different 
standards of output ‘treat [all outputs] equally’, as one institution tried to 
reassure staff? We shall discuss what counts as knowledge and which forms 
of research are valued later, but first we will discuss an area in which it 
appears the RAE has a rather conservative impact - in the disciplinarity of 
individual’s work and ultimately in departments’ recruitment practices - and we 
will highlight some of the political consequences of this. 
 
Disciplinary difficulties  
As before, the RAE08 covers research across the disciplines which are 
divided into 70 sub/disciplines. Disciplines are clumped into ‘Main Panels’ A to 
O, so that for example, main panel K includes the units of assessment called 
Education, Psychology and Sports-Related Studies, and main panel J covers 
Law, Politics and International Studies, Social Work and Social Policy 
Administration, Sociology, Anthropology and Development Studies.  
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Despite today’s widespread encouragement of inter-, multi-, and trans-
disciplinary studies and even broad recognition of the arbitrariness of 
disciplinary boundaries and distinctions, the assessment exercise reifies 
distinct disciplines in that each ‘unit of assessment’ (or department as it 
usually is) must choose which to be entered under. Whilst statements from 
the sub-panels try to reassure practitioners of interdisciplinary work by 
appointing experts from a wide range of specialisms within a discipline, this 
does not avoid the problem of having to choose one sub-panel. Some 
departments will fit comfortably into one or other category, but many others 
may house academics whose disciplinary allegiance is varied. For instance, a 
School of Education may well include researchers whose work is informed by, 
intervenes in or might for some other reason sensibly be situated in 
Psychology, Sociology, Cultural Studies, History, Geography or Social Policy. 
The task for the main panels is to ensure a degree of ‘equity and consistency 
in working practices across a group of cognate disciplines’ (RAE 01/2005: 9, 
#37, c, www.RAE.ac.uk) and so in the second tier of the assessment process 
psychological and educational research will be assessed to ‘common criteria’ 
(RAE 01/2005: 9, #38, a) because they are co-located in main panel K above. 
Sociology and Education are, however, in separate main panels. This points 
to the importance of the overarching criteria across all the panels.  
 
Whilst it would seem inappropriate to insist that all panels operate identically, 
do the ratings really mean the same when McNay’s (2003) comparative 
analysis of panels shows that the 2001 Anthropology panel gave 5 or 5* 
ratings to 70% of units whereas Economics only gave this grade to 32%, and 
when disciplines sampled very differing amounts of the research output: ‘a 
minimum of 10%’ in Business and Management Studies, ‘at least 25%’ in 
Sociology, and for History ‘an absolute minimum of 50%’ (cited in McNay 
2006). McNay (2006) concludes that panels with clearer, perhaps more 
demanding criteria, awarded a higher proportion of top scores. Some 
commentators believe that whereas differences between panels in the last 
RAE were only apparent afterwards, prior knowledge of their refinements and 
weightings would have altered the gaming behaviour of players (see McNay 
2003 and Lucas 2005). Instead, switching between disciplines happens to 
good effect between RAEs as potential units of assessment get better at 
‘playing the game’. McNay (2006) describes how, between 1996 and 2001, 
the number of submissions in Education fell from 103 to 83, and for Sociology 
from 61 to 48 as disciplinary allegiances shifted strategically for anticipated 
better funding outcomes. For example, the American Studies panel received 
only 13 submissions despite 40 current UK programmes and so concluded 
that staff’s research outputs had been disaggregated back to ‘parent’ 
disciplines rather than being submitted for this interdisciplinary subject. 
Therefore ‘what is clear is that the structure of the subject panels and their 
perceived behaviour influences the way institutional managers conceive of 
subject boundaries’ and, over time, institutional managers have learnt to play 
the RAE ‘game’ in more strategic and effective ways (McNay 2006: 153).  
 
Yet, even playing the RAE game still involves the prioritising of particular 
types of publication. Interdisciplinary academic areas may be seen as too 
dilute, and similarly, journals that are explicitly interdisciplinary can be 
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regarded as too wide-ranging and not discipline specific enough, even though 
they may be the natural home for publications from collaborative, 
interdisciplinary research (which we were encouraged to do relatively 
recently). Here our objection is to the political consequences for feminist 
research of the RAE’s powerful reinforcement of the values it enshrines. In 
particular, our concern is for feminist research work that is informed by 
several disciplines and ‘owned’ by none. This position may have intellectual 
and political advantages, but is not recognised or valued in a discipline-based 
scheme. Submissions to the Women’s Studies sub-panel were lower than 
might be expected in 2001, which can be read as a conservative or 
mainstreaming impulse to be counted within larger units of assessment. 
McNay (2006) reports that over a quarter of submissions to the Sociology 
panel were women’s or gender studies and were therefore referred to the 
Women’s Studies sub-panel. This sub-panel only received four other 
submissions via other panels, none from arts and humanities, which suggests 
it did not examine work reflecting the real range or worth of research in the 
area.  
 
Similarly, feminist journals may be assigned low status where they do not fit 
disciplinary categories and hence are assumed to have low impact factors. 
Journals such as Feminist Review, Feminist Theory, Feminist Studies, and 
Women’s Studies International Forum do not fit disciplinary boxes, and by 
virtue of their wider spread across the citations indexes may rank lower on 
any particular index. It will be interesting to see how feminist journals which do 
have disciplinary identities, e.g. Feminist Economics, fare by comparison to 
those which stand to lose most as a consequence of the valuing of 
disciplinary location. 
 
Whilst drawing together different disciplinary expertise when submitting a 
funding bid is believed to strengthen it, when it comes to publishing its 
outputs, tensions may develop over where to publish interdisciplinary findings, 
particularly when specifically interdisciplinary forums are deemed too low 
status to count for the RAE or are viewed as diluting the disciplinary integrity 
of an individual’s submission. Disciplines differ in how multi-authored papers 
are received and in how author order is read. Where author order is intended 
to indicate effort involved yet coincides with alphabetical order it may be 
assumed simply to reflect alphabetisation. Author naming can become a 
contentious issue or, conversely, a strategic (and sometimes cooperative) 
ploy in which team members still ‘needing’ a publication can be named first. 
Clearly pressures against team-working have wider implications beyond the 
RAE for the sharing of expertise, the dissemination of research findings and 
contributing to research that makes a difference. At times then the 
requirements of the RAE – and resulting practices - can be experienced as 
running counter to what Stanley has called research which produces ‘useful 
knowledge’ and ‘unalienated knowledge’ (Stanley 1990).  
 
Knowledge production: what counts, where and who says? 
So how do we work out what types of outputs count and where to publish in 
order to be rated well in the RAE? One of us was told by a senior colleague 
that he wouldn’t submit to a journal he didn’t know the editor of. This type of 
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personal contact, along with knowledge of journal hierarchies and citation 
indices are a form of ‘insider information’ that might be more available to 
individuals who are networking with senior academics and panel members, a 
practice that not all find comfortable or possible, as Gillies and Alldred 
examine in Chapter Six. This question shows a status-conscious, strategic 
approach that can distort the relationship between research and publishing 
(see e.g. McNay 1997). Research findings should surely be published in the 
journal most likely to reach the audience intended, which is not necessarily 
the one ranked most highly in RAE terms. Professional and practitioner 
journals tend not to be highly ranked, even though they may be peer reviewed 
and inform practice. Our earlier example of the publication eliciting a letter 
from a practitioner raises questions about how the value of a piece of work is 
to be measured. There is the potential for conflict with funders where they 
may want research findings disseminated in practitioner and/or service-user 
publications that will not be highly ranked by RAE assessors but will meet the 
intended audiences. Lewis is critical of the hierarchy assumed:  
‘A piece of local, empirical work which is useful to people in the locality 
and is written up in an accessible way could be classified as sub-
national because it is not couched in academic/discipline based 
formats, but from other perspectives, could be of international 
excellence in terms of quality’ (Lewis 2002: 5, cited in McNay 2006) 
 
The definition of research employed is ‘original investigation undertaken in 
order to gain knowledge and understanding’ (RAE 01/2005: Annex B, cited in 
Johnston 2005: 116). The RAE08 aims to focus on ‘quality’ and not be 
distracted by quantity by only allowing four publications per academic, and by 
reducing the need for a coherent theme across a UoA, which is thought to 
have led to a selective representation last time, involving the omission of 
departments’ ‘odd ball’ researchers who did not fit into the themes that could 
otherwise be narrated.  
 
Evidence of what types of knowledge are valued - gathered from the 
circulation of journal rankings and citation data - appears to runs contrary to 
the spirit of institutions’ guidelines based on guidance from the RAE that 
‘equity’ is the first principle of the RAE and that ‘all types of research and all 
forms of research output shall be assessed on a fair and equal basis’ 
(Institutional memo, 08/07/05). The Orwellian resonance grows when 
comparing guidance from different institutions. For example, guidelines from 
the Sociology panel states that ‘edited books, research reports, reports to 
statutory, official and private-sector bodies’ are suitable forms of output, yet 
Tina’s contribution to the earlier Women’s Workshop book (3 co-authored 
chapters and co-editorship) is not considered high status enough for inclusion. 
Feedback from mock RAEs provide contradictory messages about how the 
Education panel will receive practice-related, as opposed to theoretical work. 
 
The valuing of academic over practitioner-oriented publications illustrates one 
of our qualms about the political implications of the RAE process generally. In 
what Lewis (ibid) describes as a passive approach to informing policy or 
practice whereby academics simply publish their findings in existing status-
conscious places and expect ‘users’ to find them, we see responsibility for 
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changing the world relegated to an optional extra that some academics may 
do if politically motivated. It represents academic findings as apolitical, that 
only when applied (by others) do they have political effects. This decouples 
knowledge production from politics and absolves academics of responsibility 
for the uses to which their work is put. 
 
A clear hierarchy among different methods and approaches to research is 
embedded in the assessment exercise. Improving the quality of research, in 
RAE2001  
‘was often seen as conforming to a specific definition of quality, so that 
economists saw work in econometrics and other quantitative 
approaches being valued above other methodologies (Harley and Lee 
1997), and psychologists noted that lab-based psychology gained 
higher grades than other modes of working (Marks 1995). Their 
behaviour, in choosing what to research and how, changed 
accordingly.’ (McNay 2006: 149)  
This inevitably has consequences for what research work is conducted in 
future, engendering a conservative impact on research methodologies 
employed. In the case of education, McNay (ibid. 149) argues: 
‘The feedback from the 2001 Education panel called for more large-
scale, quantitative, longitudinal studies. That presented several 
problems: of delivering within  a short time-scale before the next 
assessment, of relevance to the work of many staff who work closely 
with professionals at the teaching-learning interface, and of attracting 
funding to a significant number of such projects. No doubt some are 
trying even now to develop such work, to be “fit for purpose” in the 
RAE, if of limited utility in improving the quality of practice, or informing 
teaching, which I see as major objectives of much work in social 
science.’  
 
Studies such as by Fisher and Marsh (2003:74) describe the impact the RAE 
process has on disciplines, such as Social Policy and Administration and 
Social Work ‘that need to adapt to the rubric essentially derived from a 
different tradition and research base’. The RAE influences the way in which 
knowledge is organised and bounded (McNay 2006). For an exercise that 
presents itself as merely ‘measuring’ what is there, the RAE has powerful 
effects.  
 
The distorting effects of the RAE are recognised at the highest levels 
including by the Parliamentary Select Committee and the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC). The latter explicitly notes the distinction 
between RAE requirements and the research councils in areas such as 
‘interdisciplinarity, applied research and research related to professional 
practice and engagement with users’ (ESRC 2004: 26, cited in McNay 2006: 
147). Yet McNay highlights the irony of citing the ESRC’s concern given that 
its own funding is more responsive to Government agendas (instead of those 
generated ‘bottom-up’ from the research community) than the other research 
councils. 
 
Whilst the RAE necessitates that academics think about what type of research 
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to do and where to try to publish research findings, it is at the institutional level 
that we will each be initially judged. The question of who is returned under the 
RAE and where is usually in the hands of those occupying more powerful 
positions within our institution. Our own disciplinary identities and allegiances 
or political commitment to making particular interventions may be irrelevant to 
bureaucratic decisions about which RAE panel our work is submitted to. 
Through regular reviews and mock RAEs our individual efforts are subject to 
internal and external scrutiny and our potential value in relation to the RAE 
assessed. It is hard to believe that individuals will not be made visible or 
vulnerable in this process.  
 
Quantitative, ideally large-scale, findings are valorised, with theoretical, 
reflexive work at the far end of the continuum of research approaches and the 
conventional distinction between academic and applied work is shored up. It 
appears that, in spite of the huge amount of critical work on epistemology, 
methodology and reflexivity by feminist and other scholars, the legacy of 
objectivism and positivism continues to influence what is most valued - and 
ironically perpetuated by - the RAE. The RAE presides over a lamentable 
narrowing of forms of knowledge production and a shift towards the most 
normative scientific models of research. Even the prizing of journal articles 
over books or other outputs in the RAE regime reflects and validates scientific 
models of research, seeing outputs as discreet packages of new knowledge 
that get us further up the mountain towards 'Truth’ (Rorty 1980). 
 
The same presumptions about the value of forms of knowledge production are 
embedded in the evidence-based movement in education which seeks 
research findings that inform practice and support (but do not critique) policy 
implementation. Qualitative research is devalued and quantitative research 
privileged in ‘systematic reviews’ of ‘the evidence’ and this has implications for 
what (and whose) perspectives are taken into account in the development of 
policy, for instance, rarely including the views of those who are the targets of 
the policy (Graham and McDermott 2005; Dixon Woods et al, 2004). It has 
political consequences for the relationship between research and policy, and 
for the way research questions get framed. It influences the type of projects 
that get funding, the types of new journals starting up or surviving the market 
and the type of funding available through the funding bodies’ choice of funding 
streams and thematic priorities. The ‘evidence base’ that is deemed relevant 
to inform practice seems to have got narrower over the past decade by the 
elevation of quantitative methods and relegation of qualitative methods in 
policy discourse. Large-scale or longitudinal studies are beyond the reach of 
many of us and funding bodies will err on the side of caution in awarding 
grants of the size required for these only to those who are seen as pre-
eminent in their field and based in prestigious research universities. This 
leaves the skills of those of us trained in qualitative approaches undervalued 
and our experience and commitment to, for instance, feminist or critical 
approaches further marginalised. Academics with an established record of 
attracting research funding are more likely to attract funding in future making it 
difficult to establish a foothold in grant-winning. The introduction of a metrics-
based system (see Sastry and Bekhradnia 2006) will worsen this: money will 
be awarded precisely on the basis of money previously won from research 
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councils and other funders (Bekhradnia 20/06/06), making the system itself 
inherently conservative. 
 
The systematic review illustrates the controlling and reductive aspects of audit 
culture in the extreme, in its ‘rage for clarity, transparency and certainty of 
outcomes‘, as Maggie MacLure writes:  
‘Exasperated by the inability of education research to deliver the kind 
of seemingly hard evidence offered by health and medicine, 
systematic review favours quantitative methods and embodies a 
scarcely-concealed positivism that places qualitative research far 
down the ‘credibility hierarchy’ (Hammersley, 2001, p545).’(MacLure 
2005: 394) 
 
However MacLure argues persuasively that it fails ultimately in its goal of 
improving quality because it reviews only those studies that address the pre-
defined question and meet the strict criteria for ‘quality’ research. The ‘tiny 
dead bodies of knowledge disinterred by systematic review’, as she puts it 
‘hold little power to generate new understandings’ and by trying to regulate 
reading, writing and interpretation, ‘suppress[..] aspects of quality in research 
and scholarship that are at least as important as clarity, countability and 
accountability - such as interstitial connectivity, critique, interest, expertise, 
independence, tacit knowledge, chance encounters with new ideas, and 
dialogic interactions between researcher, “literature” and “data”’. (2005: p394)  
 
Performing academic subjects 
What then are the consequences of measuring research performances for 
academics ourselves? As we become increasingly self-conscious of 
performance indicators and - individually audited and more visible through 
them - our research performance becomes inextricably caught up with our 
academic decisions, actions and selves, but many authors point to the ways 
in which academics feel it compromises some of the shared principles 
underpinning academic identities (Henkel 2000) and violates traditional 
academic values (Harley 2002; Lucas 2005). The overall impact of RAE-
induced pressures has been to create a more individualistic orientation and 
more competitive ethos. In compliance with the new regime we have to 
become more instrumental in our decisions about what work to take on and as 
a result, activities that are not valued in RAE terms, lose out. For instance, 
many of the smaller and perhaps more ‘everyday’ pieces of work that 
academics do such as reviewing and refereeing the work of others for journals 
and for funding bodies are either invisible or don’t count highly in the RAE. 
Evidence of an increasing instrumentalism is seen by journal editors in finding 
people to agree to referee articles. For instance, a recent article submitted to 
a feminist journal now needs a 9th and 10th referee to be approached, 
because all so far have said they are too busy. Similarly the editors of a 
proposal for a journal special issue pulled out realising they’d be ‘better off’ 
publishing their collection as a book. This is even happening for a journal that 
approaches feminist academics, colleagues who therefore have a political 
interest in the journal, not only an academic one. It represents an insidious 
undermining of the idea that academic work might be to promote social 
justice. 
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We are expected in the next RAE to comment on how much work went into a 
joint-authored publication, but how much work goes into a joint publication 
‘normally’? Against what should we compare our contribution vis a vis our co-
author’s? What about ideas generated in dialogue? This institutionalises the 
individualising notion of the originating subject. A performative model of the 
subject is assumed where it suits - such that increasing pressure on individual 
academics is expected to productively enhance our investments in particular 
types of knowledge claims and production practices – and, it is intended, to 
increase our overall productivity. But it is the Cartesian subject who is 
assumed when the originating subject is required to produce glamorous ‘new’ 
knowledge. We suspect that increasingly strategic decisions are made in 
order to prioritise individual outputs over more collegiate modes of working. 
Our concern is that the instrumentality, individualism and competitiveness the 
RAE produces in us will not be easily shaken off afterwards. It will leave us 
changed subjects. In this sense it will have been productive irrespective of 
whether it made us work any harder.  
 
Disciplined Selves 
Among those writing on new managerialism and performative regimes in 
higher education (HE) are analyses of the consequences for individuals of the 
resulting organisational cultures. Valerie Hey (2004) explores the ‘perverse 
pleasures’ of our over-commitment to intellectual labour in ‘greedy institutions’ 
and McWilliam (2004) explores how individuals shoulder the burden of risk 
minimisation in the post-welfare universities (of the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand) and her analysis of the self-auditing academic subject is relevant 
here. More specifically, Henkel (2000) and Lucas (2004, 2005) each explore 
the RAE’s impact on individuals and their academic identities. 
 
Hey (2004: 33) describes being ‘perplexed by the clash between corridor… 
critique of the impact of audit and managerialism and our manic productivity’. 
Our commitments have been powerfully reworked so that we have become 
instrumental in our own exploitation, over-complying or over-zealous, 
suggesting that there is ‘more to our punitive work rate than can be explained 
as compliance with the escalating demands of higher education restructuring 
(Marginson 1997; Morley 2002).’ (ibid. 34). The Foucauldian (1977) 
understanding of how individuals come to do the work of institutions in 
‘policing’ or disciplining themselves fits: power works through us to stimulate 
in us the desire to succeed in these terms which we may previously have 
been critical of (Foucault 1981). What role do we play ourselves in ‘buying into 
the particular economy of new times performativity and [what] rationales [do] 
we offer about our commitments and performances’ (Hey 2004: 35) when we 
know what academic culture desires and come to want that too. ‘Even our 
language is instructive’ Hey points out: ‘we learn the texts of our discipline, we 
do disciplined enquiry, we must be rigorous, and we offer our work as 
submissions’ (ibid). There is something deeply ascetic, self-denying and yet 
egotistical in this peculiar practice that indeed reveals something of the origins 
of the English university in Medieval monastic vocational devotion. We even 
allow ourselves only short-lived pleasures ‘success is always postponed in the 
race for the next prize’ (ibid.: 40). 
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In Ethics in Qualitative Research (Mauthner et al 2002) we wrote about the 
old-fashioned motive to ‘make a difference’ and feminists’ use of academic 
work for social change, but does this get ‘eaten up by the desiring machine of 
professional identity projects fuelled by ambition and personal and positional 
gains?’ (Hey 2004: 41). Hey suggests that  
‘If we are honest about what we “get out” of the current settlement, 
even so far as recognising the perversity of our pleasures, we might be 
in a better position to stop martyring ourselves – as punishment for 
those inadmissible ‘guilty pleasures’ (in intellectual work, in competitive 
endeavours, in status, in winning, etc) and put our skills and capacities 
to ‘better public and civic use’ (2004: 41) 
 
The individualising, competitive, perhaps even masochistic space of 
academia can be deeply compromising for feminists (Burman 1996; Morley 
1999), yet we help each other comply, compete and resist. Now the language 
of ‘collaboration’ has been colonised by the new managerialism that saturates 
universities and we are expected to do it for instrumental reasons (ideally with 
someone at a higher ranking institution), but some inspiring collaborations 
buck the RAE audit process. Collaborative productions that publish under a 
group name, such as the Hall Carpenter Archives (e.g. 1989) or even invent 
for themselves a name, such as the collective that published under the name 
Beryl Curt (e.g. 1994) resist the individual attribution and fantasy of the 
originating subject standard practice shores up. 
 
Valuing what we can measure 
A popular critique among educationalists of today’s over-testing of pupils in 
UK schools is that we cannot measure that which we value, and instead we 
come to value that which can be measured. This is one of the most troubling 
effects of the RAE. In addition to the way it enables us to discipline ourselves, 
the academic terrain itself will bear the imprint of the RAE into the future. 
Whatever system replaces it, when we hear ourselves referring to ‘5*’ 
departments in the future, we will know that its logic has won out. The power 
of the RAE lies in this inevitable process of reification. No matter how 
qualified, tentative or complex the outcome measures are, as soon as a 
number or rank is assigned, the qualifiers and caveats fall away. All ‘Ah buts’ 
and explanations of strategic play-offs will fail to register, in much the same 
way we sometimes feel students’ perception of our detailed formative 
feedback is utterly dominated by the summative feedback (the grade). They 
sometimes seem not to hear our explanations of (and implications of) their 
mark, they just want to know what they ‘got.’  
 
We have described some of the values underpinning the hierarchies of 
research outputs and research methods embedded in the RAE, and our 
disquiet surrounds their conservative or de-politicising effects. We may not 
share these values, but it is the fact that they are assumed that is problematic. 
In the valuing of certain types of knowledge over others, is the assumed 
supremacy of quantitative methods that rest on the naïve objectivity that 
feminists engaged with in the 1980s and 1990s. What is alarming is not that 
there exist those who do not share our epistemological perspectives, but that 
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their views are encoded in a practice which does not admit its partiality, thus 
actively undermining the recognition that different views exist. Positions stated 
explicitly can be argued with. Instead it is implicit that bigger is better in terms 
of study size, that numbers are more robust than ‘mere’ views, that the 
‘academic’ research firmly within disciplinary boundaries is of higher status 
than applied or interdisciplinary research, that ‘international’ is a marker of 
quality, and that there can be some agreement about the merits of a piece of 
research on a linear 5-point scale. The individualistic fantasy that academics 
are originators of new knowledge is reinforced too. 
 
Some of the RAE logics are powerful and worth making explicit. It clearly rests 
on, and embeds the understanding that competition benefits productivity, at 
both individual and institutional levels. Indeed if grade inflation were to be 
taken at face value, competition has been effective in raising grades and the 
application of market rationalities to education appear vindicated. However, in 
parallel with GSCE or degree results, the meaning of improved grades is 
unclear and for the RAE some contribution of better gaming and strategic 
appointments and manoeuvring are hardly in doubt. Competition has 
concentrated funding in fewer centres (AUT 2003), but is this necessarily a 
good thing? It is certainly likely to reduce the range of approaches and topics 
in a discipline. Indeed, it has ‘reduced the originality and quality of much 
academic research’ according to the Commission on the Social Sciences 
(2003: 5, cited in McNay 2006). 
 
One of the consequences of the measurement of research productivity may 
have been the rise in status of research, with the resultant individual esteem 
boosts to ‘research active’ academics (see Harley 2002; Henkel 2000; Lucas 
2005), but the drop in status for teaching and apparently resulting student 
(dis)satisfaction cannot be ignored and indeed some research-successful 
universities are now urgently trying to improve the student experience. 
Pushing research and teaching into competition with each other may prove 
unproductive for universities. It may ultimately widen the gap between the 
post and pre-1992 universities which could never compete ‘on a level playing 
field’ anyway and see the decoupling of research from teaching to reinstate 
the division between teaching-led and research-led universities. 
 
One of the most fundamental and least questioned assumptions is that 
greater funding should follow highest ratings. It seems important to make 
explicit this logic in order to dislodge its position as the obvious or only rational 
division of research money: an alternative logic would suggest that enhanced 
funding followed those departments most struggling to raise their research 
profile. Indeed this would be an educational, rather than an economic 
rationale. What is notable is the ease with which one particular logic regarding 
the allocation of money ‘on the basis of the ranking system’ comes to occupy 
the position of common sense. One of the conservative consequences of this 
is the difficulty getting onto the RAE-ranked ladder which allows existing and 
entrenched power bases to be retained and strengthened, potentially stifling 
change or the emergence of new areas of study or groups of researchers.  
 
‘How did we ever agree to a linear system of stars?’ said one colleague. That 
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such crude feedback will be the eventual result of such laborious efforts by 
both submitters and adjudicators is bemusing. How we ‘agreed’ to it, if this 
isn’t to flatter ourselves regarding our power, was through clever use of the 
process of peer reviewing (Lucas 2004). Its adoption of peer evaluation as the 
central evaluative mechanism is the key feature that buys credibility for the 
assessments. It is seen as democratising the process, so that our investment 
in peer review manufactures our consent (see also Wisker 1996). In addition, 
the process of consultation and revision of the RAE itself helps to buys our 
faith in an improving mechanism, which, in fact, mirrors science’s belief in its 
own gradual progress towards Truth.  
 
We mistakenly assume (against our intellectual commitments) the objectivity 
of a process so bureaucratised. The technical language of criteria and the 
complexity of subdivisions of evaluations all serve to convince us that this is a 
rational process. However, as the European Studies panel noted, the ‘more 
precise’ rating scales reduce panels’ discretion (McNay 2006) and loses some 
of the potential benefit from peer evaluations. Moreover, behind its proclaimed 
logic and transparency, the different interpretations of submission guidelines 
we find between (and even within) particular HEIs, imply that such guidelines 
are more subject to interpretation than their presentation admits. What it sold 
us as an objective way of ranking research outputs turns out to rest on highly 
subjective judgments every step of the way (Johnston 2005). 
 
The heart of the matter is that evaluating human knowledge practices and 
production presents a problem far messier than is implied by the types of 
technical solution considered. Even the crudely simplified rating on 5 (or even 
7) points, eventually collapses into two categories - either side of the 
(regionally variable) threshold for receiving any funding. It perfectly illustrates 
Bauman’s (1992) analysis of the rational, bureaucratic ‘solutions’ that 
modernity looks to. Psychoanalytic reflections on the RAE might highlight the 
search for a process that promises to manage and contain our anxiety which 
is fuelled by the increasingly competitive environment. The irony is that we 
invest in the RAE because we value our research (as well as the funding) and 
the identity perks offered, but that the result of this (over?) investment is a 
system that fails to reflect what we value, and worse, undermines our political 
values and potentially our commitment to research of social value.  
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